Jacobin - April 30, 2020

"These kinds of institutions and policies are ultimately what explain the gap between rich and poor. That gap narrowed in the mid-twentieth century as institutions like unions constrained the power of the rich, bothon the factory floorand in thestatehouse. But as corporate Americabegan its long union-busting crusade in the 1970s, this power was crushed, and inequality began to skyrocket."

In the post-Occupy age, the Right has had two kinds of response to the unwelcome intrusion of class inequality into the public sphere. The first, seemingly preferred response is to simply deny that the ever-widening gap between those at the top of society and everyone else is a matter of any real concern. The economist Greg Mankiw became briefly infamous a decade ago for writing a response to Occupy arguing as much, and there has been no shortage of people presenting the same case more recently in regard to Bernie Sanders.

The plausibility of this argument, however, has only declined over the past ten years. As the gulf between rich and poor grows ever larger, ignoring the problem becomes less and less credible. Even the American Enterprise Institute, a high temple for worshiping the market, sounded the warning recently, suggesting that “Republicans need to consider how to position themselves in a universe in which more and more Americans believe the state must play a far greater role in mitigating both poverty and wealth disparity than in the past.”

All in the Family

The Right’s second kind of response to the problem of growing inequality has been most recently expressed by David Brooks. From his sinecure at the New York Times opinion page, Brooks’s role is to filter concern about inequality through a combination of WASPy moralism and conservative common sense. His latest piece, “Who Is Driving Inequality? You Are,” is a typical example of this method. Brooks argues that income inequality is indeed a moral problem in our society, but he tries to domesticate it politically with two contentions.

First, Brooks argues that a focus on those at the top of society is myopic. While the CEOs and hedge fund types are certainly making out well, it’s actually the gap between the top 20 percent and the bottom 80 percent that “is most glaring and most unjust.”

This argument follows from his second point, which is that inequality isn’t a consequence of the distribution of power in our society, but instead is generated by the quotidian decisions of middle-class families to provide their children with the best they can. In an economy that strongly rewards human capital, he argues, families that invest in their children’s education and development effectively ensure that opportunity won’t trickle down.

In other words, inequality is indeed a problem, but it’s not a problem of power. It’s a problem because some people (the top 20 percent) have families that set them up for success, while others (the bottom 80 percent) can’t seem to get it together.

Obscuring the Rich

Brooks’s argument is the intellectual equivalent of a tax haven. In his world, the gains of the ultrarich evaporate. Inequality isn’t the spectacle of the superrich competing over who has the most opulent yacht, but a house in a school district where everyone goes to college. The obscene levels of privilege and power that structure the lives of the most rich are hidden away, replaced by a picture of a comfortably middle-class life.

The outrageousness of Brooks’s sleight of hand becomes apparent at the slightest examination of the data on how inequality has developed. He’s right, of course, that the bottom 80 percent have lost ground over the last half century. In 1975, about 50 percent of all national income went to the bottom 80 percent, and by 2014, that had fallen to under 40 percent.

But the story of the top 20 percent is more complicated. Outside of the top 1 percent, there hasn’t been much change. In fact, all income brackets below the top 13 percent are taking home a smaller slice of the pie than in 1975. Even the almost rich, those in the ninety-eighth to ninety-ninth percentile, just below the 1 percent, only saw their share of national income increase from about 4.5 to 5.6 percent of the total. ...
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